Power at Any Cost: Parallels Between Serbia and Georgia
Is there a common thread tying Serbian and Georgian politics, or are these parallels only surface-level? Safeguarding power and political capital at any cost, however, is a recurring theme for political elites in both countries. These elites rely on identical strategies that exploit the political system for political advantage and personal benefit. In doing so, they foster political connections that lean towards Eastern rather than Western alliances, playing up their declarative commitments to the EU until pledging against them.
On 28 November 2024, the European Parliament adopted a resolution which called for new elections in Georgia, following up on condemnation of the October parliamentary elections for being “neither free nor fair”. Nine months prior, in February, the European Parliament adopted a resolution which deemed that the 2023 parliamentary elections in Serbia were also not held in fair conditions, condemning the “widespread and systematic scale of fraud that compromised the integrity of the elections”.
Yet, electoral irregularities are not the only similarity between the two. Prompted by Russian allegations, Georgia and Serbia are often portrayed as targets for Western-backed “color revolutions”. The US was recently accused of planning a color revolution in Georgia, while the Russian President’s close ally accused the West of pursuing the same agenda in Serbia in order to bring “politicians loyal to the US” to power. Also mirroring Russia’s stances on foreign agents, Georgia introduced a “foreign agents law”, targeting non-governmental organizations and media. Similarly in Serbia, the government’s pro-Russian coalition partner, whose members are under US sanctions, submitted a draft Law on the Special Register of Foreign Influence Agents to the National Assembly.
PRESERVING THE REGIME AND ENGINEERING ELECTIONS
The Freedom House considers both Serbia and Georgia as transitional or hybrid regimes. Georgia has been characterised as partially free, with the ruling pro-Russian populist party Georgian Dream (GD) being accused of expanding control over state institutions and security forces, infringing on civil society work and independent media. Meanwhile, in Serbia, the democratic backsliding is attributed to the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), especially with regard to eroding political rights and liberties, pressuring media, opposition, and civil society.
Inter-Party Dialogue on Electoral Conditions?
The ruling parties employ similar tactics to maintain the regime’s powers. One of those is manipulating electoral rules to create a facade of a commitment to democratic standards and the EU.
The inter-party dialogues the European Union attempted to mediate – Georgia in 2021 and Serbia in 2019 and 2021, looked to overcome the political and societal crisis over election integrity and ended without results. Declarative commitments aimed at the EU and Western partners – such as lowering the threshold in Georgia or implementing ODIHR recommendations in Serbia, including auditing the Voter Registry – eventually played out. Yet, despite playing out substantial commitments, elites in both countries were engaging in comprehensive rule changes just before the elections – in Georgia in 2024 and in Serbia in 2022. While “reforming,” elections had lost their democratic character and prospects of change. The ruling elites in both countries demonstrated they are not hesitant to commit election fraud when needed to preserve power.
In Georgia, the independent election observation mission ISFED, working according to international methodology, assessed that the October 2024 elections do not reflect the will of the voters due to severe attacks on freedoms before and during election day – voter pressure, intimidation, unprecedented bribery, multiple voting, ballot stuffing, control of voting, etc. In Serbia, the CRTA election observation mission disclosed institutional manipulation with the voter registry, as well as severe instances of voting control, intimidation, bribery, etc., and assessed that local elections held in December 2023 and June 2024 do not reflect the voters’ free will.
Maintaining a tight hold on political power, at any cost, evidently undermines the fairness and legitimacy of elections. In Georgia’s case, the OSCE noted that the blurring of the boundary between the ruling party and the state is pervasive. The OSCE had come to the same observation after the 2023 elections in Serbia, stating that the ruling party largely tilted the playing field, and blurred the line between state and the party.
Political Repression: A Tried and Tested Tool
Repressive measures, mostly employed through political pressure, are commonly relied on. For example, election malpractice, especially vote-buying and pressures on voters have been a dominant feature of Serbian politics in recent years. When it comes to pressures, Serbia has developed an informal governance system, relying heavily on intimidation and clientelistic networks to exert pressure, particularly on vulnerable groups like social welfare recipients.
Similarly, in Georgia, voter intimidation, vote-buying, pressures on candidates and voters are particularly widespread. The ruling elites have nurtured a culture of political pressure. This is particularly evident in cases of vote-buying, where a pervasive atmosphere of pressure and party-driven intimidation is fostered before and during elections, especially in rural regions.
Repressive actions extend beyond elections, targeting activist and opposition-led protests in both Georgia and Serbia. Outlined in the official statement, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia warned citizens to abide by legal limits, threatening police action against any unlawful activities.
“As it is known to the public, before the convocation of the 11th Parliament of Georgia, a number of opposition parties are planning to assemble at Republic Square, starting on November 24 and march towards the Parliament afterwards. Through the media and social networks, opposition party leaders are spreading information that the purpose of the mentioned gathering is to disrupt the first session of the 11th Parliament, which may be carried out by various methods […]
Therefore, we warn the participants and organizers of the planned manifestation not to exceed the limits established by the Law on Assembly/Manifestation and to refrain from unlawful actions. Otherwise, the police will take all appropriate legal measures to foil illegal activities”, Statement of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia, 24.11.2024.
In Serbia, repressive measures are also often used against civic protests. Most recently, severe forms of repression were employed with the arrests of more than two dozen citizens and activists after protests in response to a mass tragedy in Novi Sad. This is concerning as it represents non-institutional repression, with those making the arrests hiding their identities and refusing to disclose who they are. However, repressive measures also made their way through official government channels:
“…it is obvious that certain representatives of the opposition in Serbia, nor the media that support them, do not care about the ODIHR reports or the level of implementation of the recommendations, but rather want to create the perception for the domestic and foreign audience that there is no adequate legal framework in Serbia for free, fair and democratic elections. Their desire is to keep Serbia in permanent instability and chaos, and that is why they are now using ODIHR in order to prepare for protests, which they already plan to start after the next elections, attempting to further destabilize the country if the citizens, once again, in this election cycle as and in many previous cases, do not vote for them”, Statement of the Prime Minister, 15 October 2023, Official Press Release of the Serbian Government.
“In any other country, those people (the protesters) would all be arrested for disturbing the peace, because unlike these people that the prosecution is going after today (11 arrested, including one minister), who have not committed intentional acts, just to be very clear about the difference, all these people are committing intentional criminal acts, both those who destroyed the city assembly in Novi Sad and those who beat the police officers and those who attack them every day, these are all acts committed with direct intent, just so that my message to the citizens is completely clear”, President of Serbia, November 21, 2024, Public Service Broadcaster, RTS.
YOUR FRIENDS, MY FRIENDS: MAPPING FOREIGN INVESTMENTS
Both countries have strengthened their ties with China through numerous trade and investment agreements. The Belt and Road Initiative brought a surge of Chinese investments and infrastructure projects, prompting Serbia to strengthen its ties with China. As such the highest state and party officials foster this proximity with the Prime Minister Miloš Vučević assessing that “the steely friendship between Serbia and the People’s Republic of China represents the foundation of the community of the two countries for a common future”. While China is a major economic player in Serbia, its foreign direct investments come second to the total investments of EU countries in 2023, amounting to 1,374.30 million Euros.
Through the same initiative, China’s Road and Belt program positioned Georgia as an “entry point to the EU market”. The strategic partnership between the two countries has economic cooperation as the central aspect, with GD officials portraying ties with the PRC as the next “pivotal advancement” for the country. However, unlike in Serbia’s case, analysis for 2018-2023 reveals that China has not been a significant economic actor in Georgia, and its investment portfolio in Georgia amounted to only 2.97% in 2023.